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Britain’s public war stories: Punching Above its Weight or Vanishing 
Force?  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Communications practitioners continue to see strategic narrative as vital to securing domestic 
support or opposition to war. Yet despite an extensive literature on the narratives states 
should construct, the stories domestic citizens tell about war are rarely examined. 
Consequently, the formation of strategic narratives is only informed by the stories 
governments think citizens tell, rather than those they actually tell. 
 
To address this, this paper presents a qualitative analysis of the stories the British public tell 
their country’s role in war. Focusing on genre – the general pattern of a given story – it reveals 
five narratives citizens intuitively use to interpret Britain’s military role. These portray Britain 
as Punching Above its Weight; a Vanishing Force; as Learning from its Mistakes; as being Led 
Astray, or as a Selfish Imperialist. At a time of uncertainty about Britain’s international role 
following the ‘Brexit’ vote, it provides an in-depth perspective on a state where military 
intervention is commonplace but understanding of public interpretations of war remains 
limited.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over a decade has passed since the strategic studies literature embraced the concept of 
narrative. In that time, research on the subject has grown considerably. At its peak, narrative 
has been venerated as the ‘foundation of all strategy’, considered as important if not more 
important than physical actions.1 Authors have theorised enthusiastically that the right 
strategic narrative might win wars, sustain alliances, prevent radicalisation, project soft 
power, secure domestic support, shape the identity and alter the behaviour of other 
international actors.2 The appeal of narrative as supposedly the most natural form of human 
communication has made it seem the ideal solution to the West’s strategic challenges.3 This 
has spawned a growing literature trying to discern the ideal strategic narratives for states to 
project.4  
 
Optimism at the supposedly ‘startling power of story’ has since been tempered in several 
ways.5  Critics have questioned whether some theorists have overstepped in assuming that a 
compelling narrative can be a substitute for actual strategy.6  Also, as coalition strategic 
                                                                
1 Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. “Narrative Led Operations: Put the Narrative First.” Small Wars Journal, 2012, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/narrative-led-operations-put-the-narrative-first, accessed 20 May 2016; 
Simpson, Emile. War from the Ground up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics. London: Hurst, 2012; 
Vlahos, Michael. “The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Protracted Conflict and Defeat”, 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-long-war-a-self-fulfilling-prophecy-of-protractedconflict-and-
defeat-1061, accessed 20 June 2013. 
2 Archetti, Cristina. Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013; De Graaf, Beatrice, George Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose, eds. Strategic 
Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War. New York, NY: Routledge, 
2015; Freedman, Lawrence. “The Transformation of Strategic Affairs.” Adelphi Papers, No. 379. International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006; Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle. Strategic 
Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order. New York: Routledge, 2013; Ringsmose, Jens and 
Berit Kaja Børgesen. “Shaping Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of Military Power: NATO, Afghanistan 
and the Use of Strategic Narratives.” European Security 20, no. 4 (2011): 505–28; Roselle, Laura, Alister 
Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin. “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power.” Media, War 
and Conflict 7, no. 1 (2014): 70–84. 
3 Fisher, Walter. “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument.” 
Communications Monographs 51, no. 1 (1984): 1–22. 
4 For early examples, see Kaldor, Mary et al. “Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe”, 
International Affairs 83: no. 2 (2007): 273–288; Porter, Wayne and Mykleby, Mark [Mr. Y]. A National Strategic 
Narrative. Woodrow Wilson Centre for International Scholars, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/A%20National%20Strategic%20Narrative.pdf, accessed 20 
September 2016. 
5 Haven, Kendall. Story Proof: The Science Behind The Startling Power Of Story. Westport, Conn.: Libraries 
Unlimited, 2007. 
6 Cawkwell, Thomas. UK Communication Strategies for Afghanistan, 2001–2014. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 
2015; Porter, Patrick. “Why Britain Doesn’t Do Grand Strategy.” The RUSI Journal 155, no. 4 (2010): 6–12. 
communication efforts in Afghanistan showed, coordinating multiple actors with diverse 
constituencies has proved exceptionally difficult without a message so vague as to have little 
meaning.7 A combination of cynical Western publics and an intricately networked media 
ecology make coherence and consistency hard to achieve.8 Furthermore, the prevailing 
assumption in the West of the need to be ‘first with the truth’ now struggles against a 
formidable communications challenge from Russia.9 It seeks to undermine the notion of truth 
by saturating the information environment with multiple claims of varying levels of veracity, 
understanding quite accurately that sceptical Western publics increasingly distrust anything 
political elites tell them, and cannot pick out what is plausible from what is not.10 This 
approach simultaneously suggests the power of story over rational argument, while showing 
how hard it is for the West to get its narratives to resonate with its citizens. 
 
Throughout the rise and fall of strategic narratives though, one area has been persistently 
under-researched: the narratives of the citizens governments are trying to persuade. 
Theoretically, strategic narratives persuade through ‘resonance’ with audience 
understandings of the world; their individual and collective beliefs, values, history and 
culture.11 Since it is currently assumed that humans understand the world through stories, 
effective strategic communication should logically require a comprehensive grasp of the 
existing narratives within a given culture, ideally down to the individual level.12 
                                                                
7 Betz, David. “Searching for El Dorado: the legendary golden narrative of the Afghanistan War”. In De Graaf et 
al., Strategic Narratives. 
8 Betz, David. Carnage and Connectivity: Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional Military Power. London: 
Hurst & Co, 2015; Miskimmon et al., Strategic Narratives. 
9 Petraeus, David. “Counterinsurgency Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq.” Global Policy 1, no. 1 (2010): 116–
17. 
10 Betz, David. “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency”, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (2008): 510-540. 
11 Archetti, Understanding Terrorism; Freedman, “The Transformation”. 
12 Archetti, Understanding Terrorism. 
 Nevertheless, the stories citizens tell about war are rarely examined. Scarcely any research 
has investigated how publics interpret the stories governments tell them, or how they 
construct their own. Studies of strategic narrative reception have attempted to correlate a 
given narrative with its effects on public opinion polls over time.13 However, rarely do 
researchers study the war stories actually told by ‘ordinary people’.14 Moreover, these have 
not yet been used to inform the initial process of strategic narrative construction when a new 
conflict arises. Consequently, when explaining why the country should or should not go to 
war, governments are only informed by the stories they think citizens tell, rather than detailed 
analysis of those they actually tell. 
 
This paper seeks to address this void by providing a ground-up perspective on how a diverse 
range of British citizens use narratives to interpret Britain’s role in war. In doing so it 
complements Steve Tatham’s argument that strategic communication requires a shift to 
bottom-up approaches to better understand target audiences.15 Narrative can be analysed at 
different levels. Here the focus is on genre: the general patterns of the stories British people 
tell. In doing so, it provides an in-depth, qualitative perspective on a state where military 
intervention is commonplace but understanding of public interpretations of war remains 
relatively limited.16 
                                                                
13 De Graaf et al., Strategic Narratives; Ringsmose and Børgesen, “Shaping Public Attitudes”. 
14 Smith, Philip. Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, 19. 
15 Mackay, Andrew and Steve Tatham. Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their Motives Will 
Prove Decisive in Future Conflict. Saffron Waldon, UK: Military Studies Press, 2011; Tatham, Steve. “Target 
Audience Analysis.” Three Swords Magazine 28 (2015): 50–53, 
http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/TAA.pdf, accessed 12 October 2016. 
16 Hines, Lindsey, Rachael Gribble, Simon Wessely, Christopher Dandeker, and Nicola Fear. “Are the Armed 
Forces Understood and Supported by the Public? A View from the United Kingdom.” Armed Forces & Society 
41, no. 4 (2014): 688-713. 
 The article first addresses conceptual issues regarding narrative and genre. Second, the 
investigation’s methodology is briefly explained. Thereafter, a typology of five narratives is 
presented that represent a comprehensive spectrum of the general stories British citizens tell 
about war. Each casts Britain’s national identity differently, based on shared memories of 
Britain’s military past. It is portrayed respectively as Punching Above its Weight; a Vanishing 
Force; as Learning from its Mistakes; as being Led Astray, or as a Selfish Imperialist. The stories 
offer competing visions of how Britain should act in the present and future, supported by 
different events, metaphors and analogies. These narratives will then be validated by 
demonstrating their applicability to new conflicts as they arise, using the example of Britain’s 
decision to extend airstrikes against the Islamic State (ISIL) into Syria in 2015. In the wake of 
the turbulence affecting Britain following the ‘Brexit’ vote, the article also considers what 
these narratives might reveal about Britain’s future military role in the world. The paper will 
conclude by considering the benefit of directly seeking the narratives citizens tell, particularly 
at a time of concern that pollsters struggle to gauge public opinion, mainstream and social 
media are thought either too artificially balanced or too partisan provide a reliable reflection 
of the views of a diverse and fragmented public.  
 
Narrative, Genre and War 
 
Like the concept of strategic communication, definitions of narrative are heavily contested, 
particularly the distinction between narrative and story.17 Authors such as Bal argue that story 
                                                                
17 The thorny issue of the difference between strategic communication and strategic communications is not 
addressed in this paper, since it is parenthetical to the overall argument, which concerns narrative. For 
convenience, it is referred to as strategic communication hereafter. 
is a subordinate feature of narrative.18  Conversely, Czarniawska and Selbin argue that stories 
are more complex than narratives.19 In strategic communication, scale has often been used 
to differentiate the two, with narrative thought to represent a system of stories told and 
retold over time.20  
 
This paper adopts a different position, consistent with authors such as Krebs, Snyder and 
Riessman: it deliberately conflates story and narrative.21 It does this because as a type of text, 
they contain the same fundamental features. Most crucially, these features distinguish both 
from argument or explanation. At a basic level, both story and narrative consist of a 
temporally and causally connected sequence of events, selected and evaluated as meaningful 
for a particular audience.22 Their typical features include actors, setting and plot.23 Plots vary 
in complexity, typically consisting of a beginning, middle and end based on representations 
of the past, present and the future.24 These often revolve around the resolution of conflict, 
starting with an initial situation, a problem that disrupts it, and a resolution that re-establishes 
                                                                
18 Bal, Mieke. Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009. 
19 Czarniawska, Barbara. Narratives in Social Science Research. London: SAGE Publications, 2004; Selbin, Eric. 
Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story. New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2010. 
20 Archetti, Understanding Terrorism; Halverson, Jeffry R., Steven R. Corman, and H. L. Goodall, Master 
Narratives of Islamist Extremism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
21 Krebs, Ronald R. Narrative and the Making of US National Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015; Riessman, Catherine Kohler, Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences. London: Sage, 2008; Snyder, 
Jack. “Dueling Security Stories: Wilson and Lodge Talk Strategy.” Security Studies 24, no. 1 (2015): 171–97. 
22 This section draws heavily from previous work in Colley, Thomas. “Is Britain a Force for Good? Investigating 
British Citizens’ Narrative Understanding of War.” Defence Studies (2016): 1–22. 
doi:10.1080/14702436.2016.1256209. See also Riessman, Narrative Methods, 3. 
23 Bernardi, Daniel et al. Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism, and the Struggle for Strategic 
Influence. Rutgers University Press, 2012; Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Los Angeles, CA: University 
of California Press, 1969; Corman, Steven, ed., Narrating the Exit from Afghanistan, Center for Strategic 
Communication, 2013; Miskimmon et al., Strategic Narratives; ÓTuathail, Gearóid. “Theorizing Practical 
Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States’ Response to the War in Bosnia.” Political Geography 21, 
no. 5 (2002): 601–28. 
24 Aristotle, Poetics. New York: Penguin Classics, 1996; Davis, Joseph, ed. Stories of Change: Narrative and 
Social Movements. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 
order.25 These features persist whether the storyteller (or narrator) is the state or the 
individual.  
 
The distinction between narrative text and other modes of discourse such as argumentation 
is vital because it is the conceptual basis of the utility of strategic narrative in the first place: 
that persuasion through narrative is superior because humans understand the world through 
stories.26 It is this assumption that has spawned the extensive literature on the purportedly 
unique power of storytelling, even though empirical evidence for this is not as clear cut as is 
often suggested.27  
 
In strategic communication circles though, narrative has evolved into something quite 
different. Theorists continue to emphasise that it is a superior way of communicating. 
However, it is less commonly treated as a particular mode of discourse, such as an argument 
or frame; it is taken to represent all discourse concerning a particular issue. Tatham, for 
example, explains that ‘the narrative’ encompasses ‘not just the entire corpus of texts and 
speeches dealing with a specific event but all the supporting symbolism and imagery’.28 This 
blurs the distinction between narrative and discourse. ‘Strategic narration’ becomes about 
the projection of what could be described as an overarching ‘mission statement’ or ‘vision’ 
that ties all this discourse together, explaining what an actor is doing and why. Depending on 
                                                                
25 Miskimmon et al., Strategic Narratives; Todorov, Tzvetan, The Poetics of Prose. Paris: Ithaca, 1977. 
26 Bruner, Jerome. Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986; Fisher, 
“Narration”; Krebs, Narrative and the Making; Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the 
Highly Improbable. London: Penguin, 2008. 
27 See for example Allen, Mike, and Raymond W. Preiss. “Comparing the Persuasiveness of Narrative and 
Statistical Evidence Using Meta-Analysis.” Communication Research Reports 14, no. 2 (1997): 125–131; Feeley, 
Thomas, Heather M. Marshall, and Amber M. Reinhart. “Reactions to Narrative and Statistical Written 
Messages Promoting Organ Donation.” Communication Reports 19, no. 2 (2006): 89–100. 
28 Tatham, Steve. Strategic Communication: A Primer. Advanced Research and Assessment Group Special Series 
08/28, UK Defence Academy, 2008, 9. 
how loosely one defines ‘strategic’, it also encompasses ongoing attempts to ensure that 
actions and words are congruent with the ‘mission statement’ at operational or tactical levels.  
 
It can be argued that because the ‘mission statement’ should still be structured in narrative 
form – in terms of past, present and future – that it is still a distinctly story-based mode of 
communication. However, there are two reasons to doubt that it will be in any way uniquely 
persuasive because of this. Firstly, as Holmstrom explains in the previous issue of this journal, 
the emphasis in strategic communication is on making the strategic narrative as ‘minimalist’ 
and ‘streamlined’ as possible.29 Clarity of purpose is the intent, but this eliminates the aspects 
of storytelling that are thought to make it more persuasive, such as developed characters with 
whom one can identify and a dramatic plot that engages the audience.30 A statement that 
‘Britain should intervene against ISIL to reduce the future threat of terrorism’ is a clear 
message, but it can hardly be said to contain the elements of narrative that are thought to 
make it particularly persuasive. Indeed some would consider it argument rather than 
narrative. 
 
Secondly, if all one has to do to make something ‘narrative’ is make reference to past, present 
and future, one could reasonably consider all political discourse to be narrative in nature. 
Whatever the issue, political rhetoric typically involves identifying past failures, blaming 
opposition actors for them, and explaining what one is doing in the present or would do in 
                                                                
29 Holmstrom, Miranda. “The Narrative and Social Media.” Defence Strategic Communications 1, no. 1 (2015): 
120. 
30 Green, Melanie C., and Timothy C. Brock. “The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public 
Narratives.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 5 (2000), 701-721; Haven, Story Proof. 
future to make things better.31  But if all discourse is narrative, it makes little sense to assume 
that narrative is uniquely persuasive; discourse cannot all be uniquely persuasive. The 
implication that there is something particularly compelling about ‘strategic narrative’ thus 
loses its value. It could be called ‘strategic argument’, ‘strategic explanation’ or ‘strategic 
discourse’ without any notable shift in what communicators are trying to do with the words, 
images and actions they choose: to coordinate the communication of diverse actors involved 
in a political/military project and ensure attitudinal and behavioural support for it over time. 
This is undoubtedly a vital undertaking. It is simply argued here that that the importance of 
communication being structured as ‘narrative’ has become less significant in the practice of 
strategic communication.  
 
Here it is argued that to determine the utility of strategic narratives, it is necessary to focus 
on the features that distinguish narrative from other forms of communication. Practically this 
is difficult, because modes of communication overlap in everyday discourse. Indeed the very 
idea of strategic narrative is based on the notion that stories can support an argument about 
what a political actor should do.  
 
There is a difference though between narrative and formal argumentation.  Formal argument 
involves deductive inference from general principles; narrative uses plot to create a 
framework of meaning into which events make sense as a whole, populated by characters 
with which audiences can emotionally identify. Emplotment selects and orders events to 
                                                                
31 Stone, Deborah A. “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas.” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 
2 (1989): 282. 
create a coherent story around an overall message, moral or endpoint.32 This unfolding of 
events over time is what differentiates narrative from other modes of communication. 
Studying it is therefore the key to understanding what narratives are and what they do.  
 
Emplotment can be analysed at different levels. At the micro level, researchers can examine 
the building blocks of plot through studying the events, metaphors and analogies used to 
construct narratives.33 A more common approach has been to examine the general patterns 
or overall stories that the emplotment process creates. This is narrative genre. When people 
narrate the past to make sense of the present and visualise the future, they tend to do so in 
broad, culturally familiar patterns. These overall impressions can simplify entire epochs into 
formulaic narratives of progress, decline or continuity.34 In the process they pour ‘the 
cascading and infinite detritus of history into generic forms’, even though reality is invariably 
more complex.35 Classic examples include Frye’s idea of four universal stories of romance, 
tragedy, comedy or satire; Zerubavel’s claim that all narrations of history are either stories of 
progress, decline, zigzags or cycles; along with various authors who claim the existence of 
anything between seven and twenty universal plots.36 
 
                                                                
32 Polkinghorne, Donald. Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1988. 
33 See Colley, “Is Britain”. 
34 Gergen, Kenneth, and Mary Gergen. “Narratives of the Self.” In Theodore Sarbin and Karl Scheibe, eds., 
Studies in Social Identity, New York: Praeger, 1983: 254–73; Zerubavel, Eviatar. Time Maps: Collective Memory 
and the Social Shape of the Past. London: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
35 Smith, Why War, 19. 
36 Booker, Christopher, The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories. London: Continuum, 2004; Frye, Northrup. 
Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000; Tobias, Ronald B. 20 Master 
Plots: And How to Build Them. Cincinnati, Ohio: Writer’s Digest Books, 2012; White, Hayden. Metahistory: The 
Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe. JHU Press, 1975. 
Whichever framework is preferred, studying narrative genre has important benefits for 
strategic communication, understood here as coordinated communication activities to 
advance an organisation’s aims, which for a state can include the articulation of national 
strategy, the justification of a given military operation or the tactical persuasion of 
individuals.37 This is because generic understandings of patterns of history shape how 
governments communicate their intent and purpose, as well as shaping how target audiences 
interpret the present and anticipate the future. For example, Ringmar argues that 
international disagreements about the 2003 Iraq war were because the US told a romantic, 
heroic narrative about its motives; the EU narrated a comedy in which mishaps would be 
overcome through hard work; and opponents narrated tragedies and satires borne out of 
American hubris and neo-imperialism.38 Using Zerubavel’s framework, Corman advises that 
the key to a successful withdrawal from Afghanistan is to project a narrative of progress and 
concern for the future, rather than a cyclical narrative that would reinforce to Afghans that 
once again hostile foreign invaders had been defeated.39 Smith goes further, arguing that 
genres politicians choose can affect whether countries decide to go to war.40 According to his 
framework, the more apocalyptic the genre used to describe a given situation, the more likely 
a country will see war as an appropriate response.41 
 
The genres the British people use to describe their country’s role in war are important 
because they reflect their interpretations of the utility of military force, their beliefs about 
                                                                
37 Hallahan, Kirk et al. “Defining Strategic Communication.” International Journal of Strategic Communication 1, 
no. 1 (2007): 3–35; Tatham, Strategic Communication, 3. 
38 Ringmar, Erik, “Inter-Textual Relations The Quarrel Over the Iraq War as a Conflict between Narrative 
Types.” Cooperation and Conflict 41, no. 4 (2006): 403–21. 
39 Corman, Narrating the Exit. 
40 Smith, Why War. 
41 ibid. 
Britain’s international identity, and their memories of particular conflicts. A call to ‘make a 
country great again’, or to ‘put the Great back into Great Britain’ presupposes that an 
audience sees recent national history through the genre of decline. Part of this concerns the 
strength of the military and how they should be used. The question is, what general stories 
do individual citizens tell about Britain’s military history, and how many variations of these 
shared stories are there? 
 
Methodology 
 
Public stories were derived from narrative interviews with a diverse sample of 66 British 
citizens resident in England from non-military families. The aim was to identify as fully as 
possible the range of stories citizens told about Britain’s role in war. Sampling was therefore 
purposive, based on the core qualitative research principles of range and saturation.42 In 
other words, the broadest possible variety of participants was interviewed, and interviews 
continued until it was clear that no new stories were emerging.43 
 
Participants were recruited in rural and urban populations across England, including London, 
Birmingham, suburban Liverpool, a small market town in Dorset and villages in rural 
Worcestershire and Oxfordshire. Having initially estimated that 40 to 50 participants might 
be enough to reach saturation, 68 participants were eventually interviewed, with 2 
retrospectively omitted for being active servicemen.44 The eventual sample was both 
                                                                
42 Miles, Matthew, and Michael Huberman. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook. 2nd ed. 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1994; Teddlie, Charles, and Fen Yu. “Mixed Methods Sampling a Typology with 
Examples.” Journal of Mixed Methods Research 1, no. 1 (2007): 77–100. 
43 Glaser, Barney and Anselm Strauss. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. 
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1967. 
44 For more detail on the sampling process, see Colley, “Is Britain”. 
extremely diverse (age range 18-92) but also representative in terms of gender (n = 33 male, 
33 female) and socio-economic classification.45 
 
Amongst a range of open-ended questions designed to elicit storytelling, the main focus here 
concerns participant responses to questions which asked firstly ‘What do you see as Britain’s 
military role in the world and how far has this changed in your experience?’ and secondly, ‘If 
you were asked to tell the story of Britain’s historical role in war and conflict, what story would 
you tell?’. Participants were then asked probe questions to encourage them to elaborate on 
areas where their accounts were more limited. This might have included asking them to 
expand on their views of wars they had named, their memories of how a particular conflict 
began, or why a certain war was important to them.   Interviews were audio-recorded, 
transcribed, then coded inductively into categories using NVivo 10 software based on the 
overall pattern of each narrative and the way people characterised Britain and its military. 
Consistent with grounded theory, painstaking field notes were kept to record the thought 
process through which theory was generated, as well as noting the potential influence of the 
researcher and contemporaneous events. For this reason, interviews took place as quickly as 
possible, between mid-October 2014 and mid-January 2015.  
 
Two further points warrant consideration. First, the narratives presented below are 
simplifications. As Frank notes, typologies are rough theoretical constructions 'designed to 
describe some empirical tendency’.46 Reality is invariably more nuanced and crossover 
                                                                
45 Note that the small sample size precluded statistical representativeness, but the sample was nevertheless 
proportional to the broader population in these areas. Socio-economic classification was obtained using 
National Readership Survey ABC1/C2DE criteria. 
46 Frank, Arthur. The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics. London: University of Chicago Press, 2013, 
29 (his emphasis). 
between narrative types is inevitable.47 Secondly, due to the limits of a single article, some of 
the stories have involved stitching together narrative fragments from different points during 
an interview. These exemplars have been selected to reflect the broader sample of which 
they are a part, carefully constructed to ensure that their meaning is as close to the original 
representation as possible. 
 
A Typology of Narratives of Britain and War 
 
Inductive analysis revealed that there are five narratives which capture a comprehensive 
range of public interpretations of Britain’s past, present and future role in war. Each 
characterises Britain, as the protagonist of the story, differently. Each also incorporates 
multiple storylines, depending on whether the focus is for example moral, military or 
economic. However, it was also observed that two underlying storylines provided a shared 
foundation for each narrative in the typology. These story threads were almost universal 
across the sample; a base of common-sense assumptions about Britain’s tendency and 
capability of going to war. The first is that Britain’s history is a story of Continuous War, and 
the second is that Britain is undergoing Material Decline. 
 
Continuous War  
 
There was almost total agreement that the overall pattern of British history is one of 
Continuous War. This generalised understanding is patently a simplification, since Britain has 
at certain times been involved in more wars than others. Its level of participation has also 
varied, from the ‘total wars’ of the First and Second World Wars to recent conflicts such as 
Ukraine, where Britain has merely sent a few dozen military advisors. Nevertheless, given that 
                                                                
47 ibid. 
since 1914 there has not been a single year when the British military has not seen combat,48  
and only one year since 1660 without a British military casualty,49 it is unsurprising that public 
accounts of Britain’s military role are narrated as a story of continuous war.  
Dennis (55-64, Worcs): I think that Britain has taken on the role that comes from 
history of being involved in all the conflicts and major events, and I still think that 
whenever something happens Britain expects to be involved.  
 
Nigel (35-44, Yorkshire): We’ve been there. Where have we not been? In every… most 
conflicts throughout time we’ve had a role to play in it, rightly or wrongly. But in most 
instances we’ve been there’.  
 
Isobel (45-54, Welsh): I think, worryingly, that we seem to have been involved in so 
many conflicts. Thinking of trying to build a British Empire, as it were, and that again 
involves going into other people’s countries, like in India and other places over the 
years. I think that’s the worrying thing about British history. We seem to have been 
involved in a lot of conflicts over so many years, you know. We always do seem to be 
involved. And I don’t know whether that’s good or bad. 
 
People’s views clearly vary on whether Britain should participate in war so much, but across 
the sample it was almost universally taken for granted that military intervention is just 
‘something Britain does’. So however positively or negatively people judge Britain’s wars, they 
take for granted that Britain always seems to be fighting them. 
Dennis: I think the truth of the matter is, you know, in my lifetime it’s been what 
Britain does, and I’ve never really questioned it. You just expect Britain to be involved 
in all sorts of things that are happening. 
 
 
Material Decline 
 
The second underlying narrative shared across the sample is that Britain is declining materially 
over time, as reflected in the reduced size and strength of its armed forces. The essential plot 
is that since the peak of its imperial power, Britain has become economically weaker, lost its 
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empire, and with this decline has come a reduced ability to sustain a global military presence. 
Today, Britain’s ability to fight wars effectively has diminished to the extent that it is reliant 
on allies.   
 
In most cases participants narrated a linear story, in which Britain starts from a position of 
world dominance and declines progressively over time. This is again a simplification of British 
history: decline was arguably far from linear, considering that Britain was more active in its 
colonies in the decade after the Second World War, saw unprecedented economic growth in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and became more militarily prominent under the Thatcher government 
in the 1980s than the decade before.50 But as mentioned previously, people tend to reduce 
the past to simplified plotlines rather than complex narratives.51 Moreover, these simplified 
public stories appear to be grounded more in myth than detailed historical analysis. They are 
often short on detail, with general statements describing Britain as ‘not the force we were’, 
‘almost insignificant now’, with powers that are ‘fading’, ‘sadly reduced’, leaving the country 
‘emasculated’ or as ‘weaklings’ who are ‘not big players’ with ‘not a lot of say’, who are ‘not 
listened to’ any more. What Britain has actually lost was often similarly vague, including 
‘power’, ‘prestige’, ‘influence’, ‘clout’, ‘weight’, ‘force’, ‘dominance’, ‘credibility’ and 
‘respect’. Taken together, these terms reflect the common-sense assumption that Britain is 
weaker than the past and consequently less able to get other international actors to do what 
it wants them to do. Whether this is true or not is less important than the widespread public 
perception that it is. 
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Mary (35-44, Dorset): I think we think we think we’re important. I don’t know how 
important we are. Obviously we have been important once. You know, we ruled the 
Empire. I think we’re probably a country with fading powers. We’re a tiny little island. 
I don’t know economically how important we are on the world stage.  
 
Sebastian (65+, Worcestershire):  The prevailing view from the government in power 
at the moment is that we are a formative influence on world policy, and you know, we 
can stand up in the United Nations and say ‘Great Britain thinks this’ and people take 
notice… but I’m not sure many people do these days. 
 
Five British War Stories 
 
While people across the sample agreed on Britain’s tendency and capability of going to war, 
they disagreed on their moral evaluations of Britain’s wars, and who they saw Britain as being 
in the international system. These disagreements coalesced into five different stories, 
summarised in Figure 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Typology of Narrative Genres British Citizens Use to Describe its Role in War 
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Continuously at war 
 1. Britain Punching Above its Weight 
 
The first narrative portrays Britain as Punching Above its Weight. Since the metaphor was 
coined by former foreign secretary Douglas Hurd in 1993,53 it has become the basis of one of 
the most common British defence policy narratives told by politicians, the media and 
academics.54 Imbued with nationalist sentiment, it is a story of continuity in which Britain is 
portrayed as exceptional for achieving significantly more than other countries of equivalent 
physical size or economic strength. The plot begins with Britain at the height of Empire, with 
unparalleled influence on world affairs. A series of unavoidable events then causes Britain’s 
relative material decline, as other states inevitably catch up with its early technological 
advantages. Despite this decline, Britain always manages to exert disproportionate influence 
on world affairs due to its superior historical experience, liberal democratic values, culture 
and the inherent ingenuity and moral fortitude of its people. One way it does this is by 
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Capability of 
going to war 
 
Material Decline 
 
maintaining a disproportionately strong military and being seen as more willing to use it to 
uphold the international order than others. This is one reason it is continually at war. 
Nathan (45-54, Dorset):  I think we probably punch above our weight, because with 
the cuts that have happened recently we don’t have that many soldiers, in all honesty. 
But we do go hand in hand with normally America, the superpowers, the NATOs, the 
UN, we’re always there. We’re not hanging back, we’re always there. I like that. Our 
role in the world… I think maybe because of the Empire, a lot of the developing world 
does look to Britain, and I think they maybe give us more importance than we 
necessarily deserve these days. But what we do have is a 100 per cent volunteer, 
professionally trained and mostly well-equipped army, professional army, which an 
awful lot of these other countries don’t have. They have conscription, or they’re just 
bands of bandits, banded together loosely under an idea. 
 
I think we still perceive ourselves as having a voice militarily in the world certainly. 
Economically, if America wants to do a trade deal with Japan and China that doesn’t 
involve us, they’re not interested. We’re not relevant. But militarily if America wants 
to do something it will consult with us. Firstly, because we’ve got a better army than 
them, be it vastly smaller, and secondly because they know it gives them international 
credibility. Because out of the UN it’s pretty much always in my lifetime been America, 
it’s been us, the French send a few nurses… I’m joking, but you know what I mean. 
We’ll go and do it, and we’ll do it well, as a rule. 
 
Morally, the Punching Above its Weight narrative is underpinned by the idea that Britain has 
always been a Force for Good in the world in the way that others are not. Britain’s material 
strength may have waned but it nonetheless retains ‘enormous residual respect’, is ‘highly 
regarded’ as a ‘role model… for democracy’, a ‘voice of reason’, with a ‘patriarchal role’ 
through its ‘incredible legacy’, ‘extraordinary history’ and ‘amazing heritage’. Militarily, 
Britain’s forces are assumed to be both technically and ethically superior to others. By 
implication, it is vital that Britain spearheads any military intervention deemed in the interests 
of the international community. This need not necessarily involve ground troops though; 
more limited deployments of special forces, air power and military advisors might be 
preferable. 
Felicity (45-54, Dorset): I think the only way that we can have an effective role is to 
specialise, to become the advisors more than the fighters. Our military is very well 
trained, very well disciplined, in comparison to everyone else’s. It still has its faults but 
in comparison I think the discipline shown by our military is exceptionally good. And 
we would be best to be the advisors I think. 
 
2. Britain the Vanishing Force 
 
The Punching Above its Weight narrative is attractive because it perpetuates the belief that 
Britain remains special despite decline. Nonetheless, more strongly militaristic citizens 
dismiss this as rhetoric rather than reality. For them, Britain’s military story is one of a 
Vanishing Force. This is a tragedian, nostalgic tale of moral and material decline. Of the 14 
participants telling this story, all but one was over 55. The story again begins with the Empire, 
which is portrayed as fundamentally liberal and benevolent. After the Second World War 
though, it has unnecessarily surrendered its dominant position due to inept political 
leadership, societal malaise and, for some, mass immigration. Due to these villains of the 
story, Britain is steadily vanishing into international obscurity. Whereas the Punching Above 
its Weight narrative minimises Britain’s decline, the Vanishing Force narrative exaggerates it, 
emphasising how great the country once was and the parlous state into which it has 
apparently fallen. 
 
Britain’s continuous involvement in war is once more seen as natural and positive, based on 
the self-perception that heroic Britain above all others has the resilience and trustworthiness 
to counter the illiberal powers of the world. The underlying assumption is that Britain is 
inherently a Force for Good, but this is tied to its material strength. In other words, the less 
force Britain has, the less good it can do. Not being the force it once was, it is unable to exert 
moral leadership on world affairs, to its detriment and that of humanity in general. 
Daisy (65+, Worcs): I think we’ve lost an awful lot in the last 30 years. When you think 
what we achieved after the wars, and we were a force to be reckoned with, but I don’t 
think we are any more. I think we’ve been too complacent. I think we’re pushed 
around quite a bit as a country. We are just a little island and we’ve got to learn that 
we aren’t the big players any more. 
 
Beatrice (65+, Lancs): Well [Britain] used to be great didn’t it. I think the great has 
been taken out of Great Britain now. It’s erm… multicultural. 
 
Terry (55-64, Worcestershire): If the Falklands kicked off again we would need massive 
help. We wouldn’t be able to do it on our own any more. We haven’t got enough 
firepower.  
 
Samuel (65+, Dorset): Well I think in the back of most people’s minds we will say 
upfront we know Britain’s not a major world power any more, you know, it’s all over, 
the Commonwealth’s gone, our powers are gone, you know, we’re not what we were, 
but at the back of your mind you probably haven’t given up completely on that idea. 
 
According to this narrative, in future Britain’s decline is not to be accepted or managed. 
Instead what is needed is a return to greatness through an increase in hard power to match 
the inherent superiority of the British people. Economically, Eurosceptics assume this could 
be done through leaving the European Union and returning to being a dominant global trader, 
as Britain was during Empire. But military reinvestment is particularly vital to ensure that once 
more Britain has ‘real power’ to influence world affairs, based on the realist assumption that 
military strength confers influence, ‘weight’ and ‘clout’. Otherwise it risks becoming nothing 
more than ‘Belgium with nukes’.55 
Vincent (65+, Lancs): I think we should get out of Europe, and I think we should go 
back to what we were… global traders.  You know, God almighty, we’re a nation full 
of inventiveness, we’re industrious. The ideas socially and industrially, technological-
wise, we really are, we’re leaders. 
 
Shaun (55-64, Dorset): I think we’ve become too small. And the trouble is, because 
we’re so small, at NATO we’re not being listened to because we can’t put our money 
where our mouth is. And that goes back again to what I said, we need to have a strong 
military presence because if there is a time where conflict is there, if we’ve got the 
power and the strength and the weight to do it, I think we would be listened to more. 
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3. Britain Learning from Its Mistakes 
 
If the first two narratives might be described as nationalist and militarist, the third and fourth 
might be described as liberal, in that they focus on Britain’s progress in building a more 
civilised and peaceful world after its violent imperial past. The third narrative, and the most 
common across the sample, portrays Britain as Learning from its Mistakes. The plot is simple. 
Britain continuously participates in wars throughout its history, but the nature of those wars 
changes. Starting with the Empire, Britain’s wars are exploitative and oppressive, fought for 
the wrong reasons. Imperial Britain is described as ‘arrogant’, ‘aggressive’, ‘dominating’, 
‘subjugating’, ‘bullying’ and ‘exploiting’ others in pursuit of material gain and cultural 
domination. Over time though, Britain learns from these mistakes and becomes more 
circumspect, increasingly using its military for the wider benefit of humanity. Rather than only 
seeking to advance selfish national interests, the country has moved towards working for the 
good of the world and those in need. The story is grounded in liberal internationalist ideology, 
set in a world in which liberal values are assumed to be universally desirable. It portrays a 
future of ever-increasing freedom, peace and prosperity. 
 
On the one hand, Britain’s material decline is evaluated negatively as it means Britain cannot 
so easily perform a global humanitarian role. It is also perceived positively though, since it has 
required Britain to consider how to use its military more judiciously. Having not been a force 
for good during its aggressive imperial past, the two world wars were formative experiences 
where Britain learnt to use its military to benefit the world. In future, it is hoped that Britain 
will use its historical experience to mediate or arbitrate international conflict and be a 
‘peacemaker’, rather than intervene aggressively for its own interests.   
Irene (55-64, Worcs): I suppose [Britain was] a bit of an aggressor for a very long period 
of time. A nation who didn’t really consider other nations to have any rights or… 
powers. And then perhaps that did change to a nation who was trying to do what was 
right in the twentieth century, as well as protecting itself, and not always getting that 
right but… well definitely not always getting that right, but trying to improve things. 
And I’d like to see it now as working for… world peace and a world that people can live 
in safely for the future. 
 
Kyle (18-24, London): [Britain has changed] from the pillaging outlaw and highwayman 
of the past to possibly the silver knight. We’ve made our fair share from war in the 
past, we’ve solidified our place at the table as it is. I’d say we still are a superpower 
now, because of what we’ve done in the past. We’ve made our influence known, the 
way we used to be the power. But now we don’t have that, and I’m glad of that. We’re 
not an enforcer any more. We’re just mainly there to defend, I hope. I hope that’s the 
case. Sometimes we’re a little bit misguided, but generally we’re trying our best, I 
hope. 
 
The causal logic of this narrative is that the protagonist, Britain, is portrayed as always having 
good intentions in going to war, even though its interventions sometimes have destructive 
consequences. Framing British military history in this way has obvious appeal. It renders 
Britain less accountable for its past wars, which are seen as ‘blunders’ rather than being 
‘calculated’ (Lily, 18-24, London).  
 
In future, it is hoped that Britain will continue to be more cautious and humanitarian in its 
approach to war. However, military intervention remains a viable policy option, but it should 
be used to ‘make things better’; although this seems idealistic to some telling this story: 
Danielle (35-44, London): I would like to think we remain very important … even in 
mediation. I’d like to see us less of a ground troops going in there bombing left, right 
and centre. I’d like to think of us more as a kind of… protection rather than attacking, 
so being in an unstable country and trying to protect citizens. It’s very airy-fairy, silly, 
unachievable I’m sure.  
 
4. Britain Led Astray 
 
The plot of the fourth narrative, in which Britain is Led Astray, begins the same as the third. 
Britain follows a violent imperial past by steadily learning to use military force more 
discriminately, to help others rather than just itself. But rather than a narrative of moral 
progress, this story involves a moral rise and fall. Empire, once more, is evaluated negatively. 
The Second World War is the peak of Britain’s global moral role as a ‘defender of freedom’. 
Thereafter, Britain is led astray, interfering in conflicts it shouldn’t and doing more harm than 
good.  This is most powerfully exemplified by the twenty-first century wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  
 
Britain being led astray is partly a function of material decline, which has forced it to ally 
closely with America, a more gung-ho, selfish power that is allegedly less discriminate than 
Britain in using military force. America is a villain in the story, while Britain is characterised as 
an overly passive, dependent ally that is ‘dragged into things that maybe we shouldn’t be’ 
(Olive, 65+, Oxfordshire). These wars have been ineffective militarily, offered little 
humanitarian benefit and damaged Britain’s credibility as an ethical international actor. This 
leaves Britain less willing and able to play a leading role in international conflict, whether as 
a combatant, peacekeeper or mediator. 
Deborah (35-44, Welsh): I’d probably tell a story of how we did the right thing twice, 
how in the First World War we, you know, joined in to help, and in the Second World 
War we fiercely defended people’s human rights and borders and countries, and how 
good triumphed over evil. And then I think in the story Britain would lose its way 
slightly. We’ve tried to help people on other occasions but the people didn’t really 
want our help or didn’t need our help, and perhaps we left things worse than we found 
them.  
 
Robert (35-44, Dorset): I think we’ve got a fairly proud history from back to the Second 
World War, and First World War. Maybe not so much before that, with the likes of 
Crimea and obviously building the Empire. I don’t totally think we were great… doing 
those things. But again it’s money, power and wealth. But after the Second World War, 
and in my time, we seem to be constantly getting into squabbles and wars that don’t 
seem to really finish and tend to go anywhere. They don’t tend to achieve anything. 
 
Those that see Britain as being Led Astray to take no issue with Britain’s continuous military 
interventionism per se. Instead they express concern that following the US into conflicts 
undermines Britain’s moral credibility, even if the ‘special relationship’ is a useful source of 
influence. They consider the US to be morally inferior, a country that hasn’t ‘got everybody’s 
interests at heart’ (Fatima 35-44, Oxfordshire), is ‘very self-interested and looks after number 
one’ (Samuel, 65+, Dorset). Britain, in comparison, possesses ‘a better understanding of the 
world’ (Stuart, 35-44, London), is more ‘sensible’ and less ‘aggressive’, and its credibility is 
undermined by following the US into war. The hope for the future is that Britain will distance 
itself from America and become more of a mediator and peacekeeper than an aggressor. This 
would provide resolution to the narrative and return Britain to the liberal path of using 
military force for the good of the world. Once more though, this does not mean an end to 
military intervention. Indeed Grace expresses the opposite concern: that Britain’s damaged 
credibility may mean it fails to intervene when it should: 
Grace (55-64, Worcs): I think we’ve… to some extent at least learnt from our mistakes. 
I think my biggest concern now is that the pendulum has swung again. Because we 
made a complete mess of the Iraq situation, and that and Afghanistan have really 
sickened public opinion, I think now that we’re possibly in a situation where we won’t 
do something where maybe we ought to. 
 
5. Britain the Selfish Imperialist 
 
The previous four stories are based on the assumptions that military force can be positive, 
and that Britain has always been a Force for Good at least in its intentions. However, a small 
minority (9 out of 66) told a different story: that of Britain the Selfish Imperialist: a violent, 
exploitative Force for Ill, using its military for selfish, typically economic purposes. This 
narrative combines elements of Marxist economic logic with a rejection of the civilising 
narrative of the White Man’s Burden. Britain is characterised as colonial oppressor, 
plundering the wealth of other countries for the benefit of its capitalist system.  Claims that 
its interventions protect human rights are just a new form of ‘humanitarian imperialism’ to 
impose putatively universal Western values on others.56  These combine in an anti-imperialist 
story that applies to Britain’s military past, present and future.  
 
As with the Punching Above its Weight narrative, it is a story of continuity, but this time all 
Britain’s actions are assumed to be morally wrong. The plot is a continuous stream of 
imperialist violence throughout British history that is likely to continue as long as vested 
economic interests underpin decisions to use military force. Perhaps with the exception of 
the world wars, Britain’s conflicts are fought for ulterior motives, be it land, money, oil, or the 
perpetuation of the arms trade.  
Dan (45-54, Dorset): When you actually look at the detail of it, [war is] about 
controlling situations in terms of oil, mineral resources, etcetera, etcetera. You see the 
whole argument for, say, Afghanistan, it’s [apparently] about fighting against 
oppression of the people in that country… when we all know the routes for oil through 
Afghanistan are crucial for the West. … So yes, this idea that military intervention is all 
about freedom, it’s not. It’s not in my mind.  
 
Mary (35-44, Dorset): I think Britain’s selectivity in where it intervenes is economic. 
We’re probably strategically looking at where there are conflicts bubbling up all 
around the world and which ones do we actually want to keep a lid on and suppress, 
because they benefit us economically. I know everyone bangs on about it all the time 
but I do think we’re interested in the Middle East because of oil.  
 
Lily (18-24, London): The things not to be proud of? The British Empire I suppose. I 
read something recently that there’s 22 countries in the world that Britain’s never 
invaded apparently. It’s like they were given a massive handicap because we went 
there, colonised them, took natural resources, slaves at one point, financial resources. 
The consequences are that certain parts of the world are obviously incredibly 
disadvantaged. So we’ve got a lot to answer for I think, but none of it particularly good. 
 
Bethany (18-24, London): Too often in British foreign policy we turn a blind eye, we 
make friends with dictators and human rights abusers because it suits us, and because 
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it’s easier for us, and it protects our economic interest in those areas. But actually we 
also spout about being in favour of democracy and human rights. It’s just completely 
at odds with one another.  
 
This narrative is significant because it is commonly used as a counter-narrative to any 
government claims that its military interventions are humanitarian.57 On the future, narrators 
of this story tend to juxtapose an ideal world without war with reality in which war is human 
nature. Thus even if narrators of this story fundamentally oppose Britain’s wars, they can 
acknowledge that a militarily active Britain may be unfortunately necessary. Still, the hope is 
that Britain uses its military minimally and for humanitarian purposes.  Yet they anticipate no 
progress in this regard, particularly while a supposedly militarist and nationalist British 
political establishment values military force as a source of power and influence.   
 
Discussion: The Significance of these Narratives 
 
Both these narratives, and the methods used to collect them, are potentially useful for 
strategic communicators. Firstly, they are valuable because they provide the frames of 
reference domestic citizens use to interpret new conflicts as they arise. At this stage it is not 
possible to statistically generalise the prevalence of each one to the general population. 
However, they can be validated by showing their ‘transferability’ to subsequent conflicts that 
had not taken place when the research was conducted.58 This is demonstrated by showing 
how each story provides an intuitive explanation for the British government’s decision to 
extend British airstrikes against ISIL into Syria in December 2015; almost a year after data 
collection ended. This decision, supported by a majority of 397 to 223 MPs, engaged the 
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public in a prolonged and emotive debate on whether the country should expand its existing 
intervention in Iraq.59  
 
The Syria intervention and the language used to argue for it fits the underlying Continuous 
War and Material Decline narratives particularly well. The opposition’s formal questions to 
Prime Minister during the ten-hour parliamentary debate focused almost solely on the 
efficacy of the intervention rather than the principle of military intervention itself. Questions 
asked whether intervention would ‘make a significant military impact’; ‘be successful without 
ground forces’; lead to ‘mission creep’ or increase the ‘threat of terrorist attacks in the UK.60  
The general principle of whether Britain should use military force to achieve political 
objectives was not questioned. The debate thus reflected continuity in military force being a 
legitimate and natural policy instrument. The smaller size of the intervention compared to 
past wars also strongly reflected the Material Decline narrative. 
 
The government’s justification for extending airstrikes contained strong echoes of the 
Punching Above its Weight narrative. It specifically emphasised that Britain’s allies had 
requested Britain’s help because it possessed the Brimstone missile system, which is 
apparently technologically superior to any of their own. Cameron’s memorandum to the 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee emphasised that the precision of the missile system was a 
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capability ‘even the US do not possess’.61 Meanwhile, he described Britain’s intelligence and 
surveillance as ‘second to none’. Together these would give Britain an ‘important and distinct 
role’ in coalition efforts against ISIL.62  
 
The other pillar of Cameron’s argument was Britain’s moral obligation to support its allies, 
particularly in the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015.63 By playing the role 
of ‘reliable ally’ there is also continuity in Britain being willing to step in when others might 
lack the same self-sacrificing attitude.64 Taken together, the government’s argument 
emphasised Britain’s technological superiority in matters of war and moral fortitude in being 
more willing to help others. In other words, it was Punching Above its Weight.  
 
The rhetorical trick in this narrative is that in focusing on Britain’s apparent technological 
superiority, it obscures the remarkably small material contribution Britain actually made. 
After a month of the operation, only four sorties had been flown in Syria by British forces, and 
one of those was an unmanned drone strike.65 As a result, the Syria intervention also fits the 
Vanishing Force narrative. It seems to be an obvious example of a country vanishing further 
from the world stage, especially when compared to the mythical days when Britain only 
needed to send a gunboat to get its way. Now though, it can only send a pathetic quantity of 
its decimated forces to a conflict upon which is has no real influence.  
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 The smaller scale and more cautious targeting in the Syrian air campaign also fits the Learning 
from its Mistakes narrative though. From this perspective the use of more accurate Brimstone 
missiles and the limited scope of British military action fit into a story where Britain is learning 
to become more discriminate in the use of military force and more cautious about civilian 
casualties. Britain’s warfighting, even if more limited in scope, has become more 
humanitarian. Again, the impression that Britain is more concerned about this than others 
further reinforces British moral exceptionalism.  
 
The Syria intervention can also be framed to fit the Britain Led Astray narrative. For once more 
Britain is following the US into a conflict in the Middle East with no long term political 
objective; or at least no explicit roadmap for a political solution, and with the potential for 
mission creep to expand the scale of the operation. The intervention can actually fit both of 
these liberal interpretations simultaneously. Britain could be perceived as Learning from its 
Mistakes in minimising civilian casualties, but despite this is still being Led Astray into wars it 
should keep out of.  
 
Finally, the Syrian intervention also fits the story of Britain the Selfish Imperialist. Through this 
interpretive lens, Syria is just another example of a Middle Eastern country that either has oil, 
or is next to Iraq that does, and so Britain’s involvement is just a continuation of Western 
attempts to control strategic resources for its own ends. Moreover, the government’s 
emphasis on Brimstone could be interpreted as reflecting the desire to perpetuate the arms 
trade. As with all these interpretations, whether this corresponds to reality is irrelevant; the 
idea that war is ‘fought for oil’ provides many with a common-sense explanation for Britain’s 
involvement whether notable resources are at stake or not. 
 
Despite the ease with which these narratives enable citizens to make sense of the Syrian 
intervention, it is not claimed that these stories are universally applicable to all wars Britain 
has ever fought. Like all narratives they are a product of a particular time and place. The Led 
Astray narrative is particularly applicable to the conflicts related to the War on Terror. It is 
clearly less relevant to conflicts such as the Falklands, where Britain acted independently. Still, 
national stories rarely experience dramatic shifts. They can do in moments of crisis, but it is 
more likely that new events are incorporated into existing narratives rather than new ones 
being created from scratch.66  
 
Brexit, Britain and future war 
 
The ‘Brexit’ vote is a sufficiently historic occurrence that it might engender a new narrative 
about Britain’s role in the world, with direct implications for defence policy.  Again though, 
the general stories identified here can help make sense of how British citizens interpret the 
past and anticipate the future. The rationale for Brexit is strongly underpinned by the 
exceptionalist assumption that Britain is better off alone, as evidenced by the fact that it has 
always Punched Above its Weight in comparison to others. Consequently, this is likely to 
remain a prominent lens through which British defence policy is understood. For those who 
see the EU as the cause of Britain becoming a Vanishing Force, leaving may well be seen as 
                                                                
66 Subotić, Jelena. “Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change.” Foreign Policy Analysis 12 
(2015): 610-627. 
the country Learning from its Mistakes, particularly if it is accompanied by increased military 
investment. Conversely, those who currently see Britain as Learning from its Mistakes in 
leading the world towards peace may shift their perspective to that of the Vanishing Force 
narrative if diminished economic and diplomatic clout undermines Britain’s ability to fulfil a 
peace-making role. If leaving the EU leads Britain closer to the US to compensate for an 
inevitable reduction in influence in Europe, then the Led Astray narrative may remain 
prominent. Meanwhile the Selfish Imperialist narrative is likely to persist whenever the 
government embarks on subsequent military interventions, not least because it is hard to 
prove that there are not ulterior economic motives for doing so. 
 
Overall, military interventionism has been shown to be an important element of British 
national identity for both political elites and the public.67 It would therefore be unsurprising 
if policymakers sought to compensate for any diminution in economic and diplomatic position 
with increased military activism. This suggests the enduring rhetorical appeal of the Punching 
Above its Weight narrative, even as the gap widens between Britain’s intent and military 
capabilities.68 As King suggests, Britain may no longer be able to punch above its weight, but 
it can still maintain its sense of identity by talking above it, however strategically unsound this 
may be.69 Whatever happens, with British citizens still viewing the military as the country’s 
greatest source of international influence,70 it is a crucial element in Britain’s future 
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international role. Studying the stories the public tell about the military potentially provides 
valuable insights into the future that domestic citizens want or expect their country to have.   
 
Qualitative narrative analysis: an additional Strategic Communication methodology 
 
The second way this research is valuable for strategic communicators is that it demonstrates 
a ground-up, narrative-specific method to understand how different target audiences 
interpret war. Mackay and Tatham have recently emphasised the importance of Target 
Audience Analysis (TAA), which aims to provide a comprehensive, bottom-up understanding 
of specific population groups.71 It does so using three levels: a third tier of remote, open 
source research on the target population; a second tier of primary research but which is 
‘scientifically unverified’; and a primary tier of deductive, hypothesis-tested research 
considered to be ‘by far the most useful’ aspect of the process.72  
 
TAA’s ground-up approach is undoubtedly a valuable means to understand audiences more 
directly. However, it is suggested here that its second tier of primary research may be more 
significant than its authors imply. This is particularly the case when dealing with narratives, 
which rest on interpretation and not verifiable fact. Hypotheses do not arise from nowhere; 
they rest on existing understanding derived inductively using more open-ended methods. The 
qualitative narrative analysis employed here may not, in Tatham’s words, follow a 
‘scientifically verified deductive methodology’.73 Nonetheless, it provides a systematic means 
to identify the range of stories told about a given issue across a certain population. Doing so 
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provides a greater depth of understanding of how people interpret the world than closed 
surveys or polls do.74 
 
Undertaking narrative interviews among a target population is undoubtedly labour-intensive. 
Nonetheless, since the aim at this stage is to grasp the full range of narratives rather than 
statistically determine their prevalence among the population, the number of interviews can 
be kept relatively small by interviewing until the point of data saturation. Having elicited these 
stories, they can then be deployed in quantitative research on a much larger scale to see how 
factors such as age, gender, ethnicity or socio-economic classification affect which stories are 
most significant to a given population. Extending this study, it would be particularly 
interesting to compare how English, Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish citizens interpret 
Britain’s wars. More generally though, the method is applicable for research into both 
domestic and foreign audiences on a variety of issues. If strategic communicators are 
genuinely interested in narrative as a specific form of communication, rather than simply 
coordinating messaging in any format, then understanding the stories told by target 
audiences is crucial, whatever the issue. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
 
To finish, this paper has investigated the narrative genres British citizens use to explain their 
country’s role in war. In the process it has sought to demonstrate the benefits a ground-up, 
narrative-specific approach can provide to researchers in strategic communication. Such 
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methods reflect the need for strategic communicators not just to understand civilian 
audiences in conflict theatres, but domestic populations too. Moreover, if it is assumed that 
humans understand the world using stories, then attempts to persuade should arguably begin 
with the stories they already use to interpret the world. 
 
Studying individual citizens’ narratives directly does not just deepen understanding of how 
people interpret war; it reduces the likelihood that citizens’ views will be misread. As Kull and 
Destler explain, policymakers have frequently assumed that a reasonable indication of the 
public mood can be derived from a combination of media representations and opinion polls.75  
However, the utility of both as indicators of the views of the population has been thrown into 
question by recent events. The 2015 British general election, the ‘Brexit’ vote and the US 
presidential election all confounded pollsters’ predictions. Meanwhile, each campaign 
generated concerns that some mainstream media organisations in Britain such as the BBC 
were overly neutral, while social media fosters echo-chambers in which people experience 
increasingly biased media coverage, making it harder to access them with alternative, and in 
some cases more truthful, perspectives. These make direct attempts to understand public 
views seem more pressing than ever. 
 
While the focus here has been on British public interpretations of war, useful insights would 
also be gained through comparisons with other countries. Stories are always likely to be 
culture-specific, particularly in the events, analogies, heroes and villains people choose. 
Nevertheless, the discourses underpinning them, such as liberalism, Marxism or nationalism, 
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lend themselves to certain genres more than others.  Different nations may therefore tell 
similar narratives, but the turning points in their plots may differ. A Learning from its Mistakes 
narrative in China might involve avoiding the ‘century of humiliation’ that the country 
suffered under imperialism. In Britain it may mean learning to use military force more 
judiciously; in Germany it might involve avoiding using military force at all.  
 
This cross-cultural understanding is particularly important given that present and future 
military interventions are likely to be coalition based. As the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan 
showed, strategic narrative coordination across coalition members is exceptionally difficult. 
But as long as strategic communicators seek to use narratives to persuade, they will be better 
informed by direct study of the stories citizens already use to understand the world. 
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